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ARE AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES POSSIBLE? 
  Shawn Bayern 
ABSTRACT—Over the last few years, I have demonstrated how modern 
business-entity statutes, particularly LLC statutes, can give software the 
basic capabilities of legal personhood, such as the ability to enter contracts 
or own property.  Not surprisingly, this idea has been met with some 
resistance.  This Essay responds to one kind of descriptive objection to my 
arguments:  That courts will find some way to prevent the results I describe 
either because my reading of the business-entity statutes would take us too 
far outside our legal experience, or because courts will be afraid that robots 
will take over the world, or because law is meant to promote human (versus 
nonhuman) rights.  As I demonstrate in this essay, such objections are not 
correct as a descriptive matter.  These arguments make moral and policy 
assumptions that are probably incorrect, face intractable line-drawing 
problems, and dramatically overestimate the ease of challenging statutorily 
valid business structures.  Business-entity law has always accommodated 
change, and the extensions to conventional law that I have identified are not 
as radical as they seem.  Moreover, the transactional techniques I advocate 
for would likely just need to succeed in one jurisdiction, and regardless, there 
are many alternative techniques that, practically speaking, would achieve the 
same results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a series of articles that started in the Northwestern University Law 
Review Online in 2014, I laid out a transactional technique that permits legal 
entities (mainly LLCs) in the United States to be governed entirely by 
autonomous systems or other software, without any ongoing necessary legal 
oversight or other involvement by human owners or members.1 In particular, 
I raised the possibility that many state LLC statutes permit the development 
of zero-member LLCs governed exclusively by an operating agreement (and, 
of course, background common, statutory, and constitutional law). The 
practical importance of this technique is that it allows software systems to 
achieve a very close surrogate for legal personhood. If we polled a hundred 
lawyers, they probably all would agree that a robot could not buy real estate 
or that a software system could not enter a contract except on behalf of some 
other legal actor. But the main consequence of my argument is that for 
practical purposes, autonomous systems can indeed act in these ways under 
current law, without any special new legal recognition of rights for software. 
One reaction to my proposed technique has been honest horror: “The 
survival of the human race may depend” on rejecting the premises of my 
argument.2 The overall benefits and dangers of autonomous legal entities is 
a topic for another time, however. This Essay addresses a different line of 
 
 1 Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. 
U. L. REV. ONLINE 257 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Zero-Member LLC]; Shawn Bayern, The Implications 
of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 
(2015) [hereinafter Bayern, Autonomous]; Shawn Bayern et al., Company Law and Autonomous Systems: 
A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 135 (2017) 
(discussing variants of this technique in the context of English, German, and Swiss law).  
 2 Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 953 (2018). 
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concern that has arisen about my argument—specifically, whether it is the 
correct view of LLC statutes in the first place. 
In a series of online essays and eventually an article in the Nevada Law 
Journal, Matt Scherer has attempted to show that my legal argument will not 
work under LLC statutes.3 The main force of his criticism, though he does 
not use quite these words, is that my proposed technique is too crazy for 
courts to tolerate.4 Maybe, his argument runs, it is an acceptable literal 
reading of various LLC statutes, but autonomous entities would clearly 
violate the statutes’ intent and structure, and courts would stop them the way 
they would stop other sorts of technical abuses of statutes and regulations. 
The purpose of this Essay is to show that that line of criticism is 
mistaken and to suggest, simply as a matter of positive law, that my reading 
of the LLC statutes is correct. To be clear, my blueprint for creating 
autonomous LLCs is just a product of current statutes; with appropriate 
legislative will, they could all be repealed in due course. Moreover, my goal 
here is not to discuss other, non-statutory sources of legal capabilities for 
algorithms, although there may indeed be others;5 it is simply to show that 
the statutes do what I say they do and that it would be both odd and 
exceedingly difficult for courts to stop the statutes from working in the way 
I describe. That may seem like a relatively narrow point, but it is important: 
If even a single state’s courts interpret LLC statutes as I suggest, then 
autonomous entities can be created in that state and would almost certainly, 
under current law, be recognized elsewhere. 
This Essay proceeds in several stages. In Part I, I briefly recap my 
transactional technique for creating autonomous entities. In Part II, I describe 
how, as a practical matter, nothing can or will stop this technique from 
 
 3 Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The Legal Status of Autonomous 
Systems, 19 NEV. L.J. 259 (2019) [hereinafter Scherer, Beasts]; Matthew U. Scherer, Is AI Personhood 
Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part One: New York), LAW & AI (May 14, 2017), [hereinafter 
Scherer, Part One], http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/14/is-ai-personhood-already-possible-under-
current-u-s-laws-dont-count-on-it-part-one [https://perma.cc/S4WE-X2QY]; Matthew U. Scherer, Is AI 
Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part Two: Uniform LLC Act), LAW & AI (May 
21, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/21/is-ai-personhood-already-possible-under-current-u-s-
laws-part-two-uniform-llc-act [https://perma.cc/M53N-N8T9]; Matthew U. Scherer, Is AI Personhood 
Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part Three), LAW & AI (June 18, 2017), 
http://www.lawandai.com/2017/06/18/is-ai-personhood-already-possible-under-u-s-llc-laws-part-three 
[https://perma.cc/68QV-XWR9]. 
 4 See infra Section III.A. 
 5 Most simply, an algorithm may direct some of the activities of an existing legal entity even if it 
does not control the entirety of that entity—precisely to the extent that a conventional contract may do 
so. Other potential existing legal sources for the capabilities of algorithms include contract law, trust law, 
and the common law of unincorporated associations. 
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working if private actors intend for it to work.6 In other words, my technique 
is viable de facto, regardless of technical statutory interpretation or legal 
theory. In Part III, I give a more thorough legal justification for my 
interpretive view of the LLC statutes, defending it de jure rather than just 
practically. 
I. CREATING AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES 
My principal contention is that a novel transactional technique can 
bestow the practical capacities of legal personhood on any system, such as a 
software system, with verifiable states or output.7 Importantly, I am not 
concerned here with the more recently politicized conceptions of legal 
personhood that implicate constitutional rights;8 in the context of American 
law, I consider those rights to be matters of constitutional or statutory 
interpretation that have nothing to do with my argument. Instead, I am 
concerned only with a thin conception of legal personhood implicating 
“simply the capacity of a person, system, or legal entity to be recognized by 
law sufficiently to perform basic legal functions”9 such as entering a contract, 
owning property, suing, being sued, acting as a principal or an agent, entering 
into a general partnership, serving as a corporate shareholder, and so on. 
More technically, “[a] somewhat more formal definition that conveys a 
similar message is that a legal person . . . is anything to which the law can 
ascribe any Hohfeldian jural relation, such as a right, duty, or power.”10 
The technique I have outlined has four steps: 
(1) An individual member (the “Founder”) “creates a member-managed 
LLC, filing the appropriate paperwork with the state” and becomes the sole 
member of the LLC. 
(2) The Founder causes the LLC to adopt an operating agreement 
governing the conduct of the LLC. “[T]he operating agreement specifies that 
the LLC will take actions as determined by an autonomous system, 
 
 6 Matt Scherer appears to accept this argument. See Scherer, Part One, supra note 3 (“I do not see 
any provisions that would obviously prevent or even discourage such a setup.”). 
 7 I use the term “verifiable” in roughly the same way contract-theory economists do. See, e.g., Jean 
Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 755 (1999) (“The bottom 
line of this literature is that the nonverifiability of information by a court is in general no obstacle to the 
implementation of contracts contingent on this information as long as this information is commonly 
observed by several parties.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 9 Bayern, Autonomous, supra note 1, at 94. 
 10 Id. at 94 n.1; see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (defining and classifying “jural relations”). 
114:23 (2019) Are Autonomous Entities Possible? 
27 
specifying terms or conditions as appropriate to achieve the autonomous 
system’s legal goals.”11 
(3) The Founder transfers ownership of any relevant physical apparatus 
of the autonomous system, and any intellectual property encumbering it, to 
the LLC. 
(4) The Founder dissociates from the LLC, leaving the LLC without 
any members.12 
The result is an LLC with no members governed by an operating 
agreement that gives legal effect to the decisions of an autonomous system. 
No other legal person remains behind to govern the LLC internally. Of 
course, the LLC is still subject both to external regulation and to LLC law. 
For example, like any LLC, it might face regulatory prohibitions, and the 
state or other eligible parties might bring an action against it for 
administrative dissolution. But the autonomous system has gained a 
significant amount of freedom: it can act legally for an entity without the 
internal governance of that entity being in the hands of any separate legal 
person. 
If this technique works, it lets software systems interact with the 
foundational features of the legal system without acting for existing parties. 
Importantly, the system does not need to be “intelligent” in any specific, 
predefined way. The system might be simple and achievable with today’s 
technology—say, an online cloud-computing broker or an algorithmic 
escrow agent—or, in the future, it might be a fully intelligent actor as 
portrayed in speculative fiction. For a system to work with comprehensive 
functional autonomy, it would probably need to be smart enough to know 
how to hire a lawyer if the entity is sued, or else it could be subject to 
arbitrary default judgments.13 But the capacity for such hiring could be 
programmed formulaically (or, for example, a lawyer could be hired on 
retainer from the start of the entity’s existence with the power only to respond 
defensively to lawsuits) without significant advances in artificial 
intelligence. 
In the outline above, step 1 is clearly uncontroversial; everyone today 
believes that a single-member LLC is possible, although it is worth noting 
that even a single-member company was once regarded as a controversial 
type of entity, arising out of what was considered a loophole several 
 
 11 Bayern, Autonomous, supra note 1, at 101. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the 
clerk must enter the party’s default.”). 
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generations ago.14 One possible objection to step 2, nicely suggested 
(although not specifically applied to this transactional technique) by the work 
of my colleague Lauren Scholz, is that an operating agreement that defers in 
an open-ended manner to the operation of software may be too indefinite to 
be enforced.15 I have responded to that possible objection in previous work.16 
In short, modern contract law appears uncontroversially to enforce 
agreements far more indefinite than the ones that step 2 requires, and in any 
event, the agreement can be made as definite as necessary. Step 3 is 
uncontroversial because LLCs can clearly own tangible and intangible 
property.17 The main descriptive objection to the technique overall has been 
to step 4. In particular, Matt Scherer’s objection is that courts simply would 
not allow an LLC to continue once the only member—in my outline above, 
the Founder—has dissociated or withdrawn.18 
II. THE WORKABILITY OF LLCS WITHOUT ONGOING HUMAN INTERNAL 
GOVERNANCE 
For practical purposes, the technique I outlined in Part I is not needed 
if the goal is to give software systems the practical capabilities of legal 
personhood. Two different but conceptually similar transactional techniques 
make it practically possible, perhaps less controversially, for a modern LLC 
to be governed in an ongoing fashion by an operating agreement (and hence 
an algorithm with a verifiable state)19 without regard to ongoing consent by 
the LLC’s members. The first technique uses cross-ownership in order to 
 
 14 See Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 
18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 474-75 (1953) (“It is most doubtful whether the concept of corporate 
enterprise was ever intended or designed to embrace this institution. Nevertheless the one-man company 
and the family corporation have become familiar modes of business enterprise and, despite occasional 
questioning by a court or a writer, have generally received judicial sanction and approval.”); Warner 
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1374 
(1938) (“One accustomed to accept language at its face value would be at a loss to find authority for the 
creation or existence of [a one-person] corporation in enabling legislation. With rare exception the one-
man corporation has not been expressly authorized under the general incorporation statutes, and if the 
language of the statutes is to be given its fair import, none would seem even to be contemplated.”). The 
commonplace occurrence of single-member companies today suggests the flexibility of business law, a 
point to which I will return in Part III. 
 15 See generally Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017) 
(arguing that contracts that defer to algorithms may be too indefinite to be enforced). 
 16 Shawn Bayern, Artificial Intelligence and Private Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 148 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) [hereinafter Bayern, 
Artificial Intelligence]. 
 17 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (RULLCA) § 402 (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
amended 2013) (recognizing that “property” may be transferred to an LLC). 
 18 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 19 See Tirole, supra note 7, at 755. 
114:23 (2019) Are Autonomous Entities Possible? 
29 
satisfy any concern that legal entities must have members. If membership is 
formally necessary under an LLC statute—if there is a legal difference 
between having members and not having members—then groups of LLCs 
can be created that own one another. The second technique relies on a strong 
trend in organizational law that permits the governance of legal entities by 
operating agreement. Operating agreements may establish a default state of 
affairs and make it practically impossible, because of procedural 
requirements and other vetogates, for any preexisting legal persons or 
collections of them to adjust this default state. In practice, both these 
techniques empower an LLC’s operating agreement—or any observable 
system that the operating agreement recognizes (such as an autonomous 
software system)—to govern an LLC without the practical possibility of 
ongoing oversight by LLC members. These techniques should be both 
relatively uncontroversial and extraordinarily difficult for courts to police. 
Moreover, if even one state permits them, other states are unlikely to 
interfere with their operation on the ground that internal governance is a 
matter of the law of the state in which an entity is organized.20 Moreover, 
even without these techniques and purely as a practical matter, organizers of 
an LLC may achieve similar results through outright defiance of the law, 
which is extremely difficult to detect or prevent. 
A. Cross-ownership 
The first of these techniques is achieved as follows: 
(1) An individual member (the “Founder”) creates two member-
managed LLCs, A and B, filing the appropriate paperwork with the state. The 
LLCs each start with a single member, the Founder. 
(2) The Founder causes each entity to adopt a desired operating 
agreement that sets the parameters under which each entity operates (e.g., 
deferring control to an algorithm). 
(3) The Founder causes A to admit B as a member and B to admit A as 
a member. 
(4) The Founder dissociates from both A and B. 
At the end of this procedure, two entities exist. Each functions just as 
described in Part I, acting only under the control of the operating agreement, 
which may defer all decisions to an algorithm.21 Accordingly, there is no 
practical need to press the point that the final member may dissociate, 
leaving a memberless entity. 
 
 20 E.g., RULLCA § 106(1). 
 21 See discussion supra Part I. 
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In the classical American corporation, shares held in this form of cross-
ownership are prevented by statute from voting because they would 
otherwise serve as a formal technique to cement control of an existing board 
of directors.22 This prohibition is absent from the typical LLC statute, which 
generally does not attempt to address the policy concerns associated with the 
takeover of public entities or the defenses of those takeovers by the existing 
directors.23 In any event, neither LLC would need to vote as a member of the 
other LLC to achieve the scheme’s functional goal. The “freedom of 
contract” that conventionally underlies the polices behind LLCs24 includes 
the freedom to set up this sort of cross-ownership of voting shares. 
B. Vetogates 
In 1992, McNollgast (itself an artificial entity of sorts)25 used the term 
“veto gates” to describe opportunities for opponents of proposed public 
legislation to prevent it from being enacted; the notion is now familiar to 
students of political economy. In short, many actors, practically speaking, 
need to approve bills before they can become laws.26 Veto gates—more 
typically now written as “vetogates”27—can also easily arise, accidentally or 
by design, in private operating agreements written for business entities. For 
example, it is commonplace to see cases in which a small business entity 
requires a supermajority of its members to change the status quo.28 It is also 
possible—and not at all rare—for LLC operating agreements to create 
situations in which the members deadlock, leading to indefinite periods 
during which the entity is paralyzed because nobody can act for it 
 
 22 E.g., General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (West 2019) (“Shares of its own 
capital stock belonging to the corporation . . . shall neither be entitled to vote nor be counted for quorum 
purposes.”). This includes shares belonging to another corporation, “if a majority of the shares entitled to 
vote in the election of directors of such other corporation is held, directly or indirectly, by the 
corporation . . . .” Id. 
23 Cf. RULLCA pref. note (observing that LLCs are most influential outside public capital 
markets).  
 24 See Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (West 2019) (“It is the 
policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”). 
 25 McNollgast is a pseudonym used by three distinguished academic commentators on political 
economy. See Linda R. Cohen, Politics and the Courts: A Comment on McNollgast, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1685, 1685–86 (1995) (discussing McNollgast). 
 26 Others, most notably William Eskridge, have analyzed the role of “vetogates” extensively in public 
law. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756 
(2012) (analyzing the consequences of vetogates for judicial review of agencies’ interpretations of 
statutes). 
 27 See generally id. 
 28 See e.g., Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, C.A. No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
May 7, 2008) (considering an LLC whose operating agreement required a supermajority vote from its 
board for “all essential decisions”). 
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effectively.29 Deadlock is commonplace enough that many LLC statutes aim 
to address it by giving courts the power to break deadlock by dissolving an 
entity upon suit by a member,30 although the granting of such relief is itself 
extremely rare because courts are concerned about destroying potentially 
productive businesses and picking sides among equally blameless (or 
blameworthy) parties.31 Moreover, when dissolution for deadlock is granted, 
it is ordinarily judged in view of the policies of the operating agreement. As 
a New York appellate court put it, “the only basis for dissolution [for 
deadlock] can be if [the entity] cannot effectively operate under the operating 
agreement to meet and achieve the purpose for which it was created.”32 
Accordingly, it is not difficult for the author of an LLC’s operating 
agreement to write it in such a way that the owners, members, or managers—
even if they do exist—are powerless figureheads. The imagination of 
lawyers is the only limit on how comprehensively such agreements might 
prevent changes to the status quo. To put it differently, even if the technique 
I described in Part I is not possible, drafters of operating agreements can 
approach its result—the triumph of an existing operating agreement over 
ongoing governance by members—asymptotically. A supermajority voting 
requirement is a simple, commonplace first step toward that destination, but 
more creative techniques are possible. 
Imagine, for example, the appointment of 1,000 members to a new 
LLC. The members are chosen largely at random, with little connection to 
the other members, and with wide geographical and social dispersion. Each 
of these members is paid a nominal sum to agree to become a member and 
is assured that the limited-liability status of the entity means that they incur 
no, or at most negligible, personal risks for accepting that status.33 Then, 
imagine that the operating agreement requires that any new business 
decisions (whether ordinary or extraordinary),34 or any amendments to the 
 
 29 See id. 
 30 E.g., RULLCA § 701(a)(4)(B) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013) (granting judges the 
ability to dissolve an LLC when “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and 
affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement”). 
 31 See, e.g., In re Arrow Inv. Advisors, LLC, C.A. No. 4091-VCS, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 66, at *8 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2009) (“Given its extreme nature, judicial dissolution is a limited remedy that this court 
grants sparingly.”); In re Dissolution of 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, 72 A.D.3d 121, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010) (“Dissolution is a drastic remedy”). 
 32 In re Dissolution of 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, 72 A.D.3d at 130. 
 33 If this structural legal guarantee is not enough, the organizer may pay for further private insurance 
for the members or simply compensate them more for accepting the risk. 
 34 The law of unincorporated businesses often draws a distinction between matters in the “ordinary 
course” of business, typically governed by default by a majority vote, and other matters, which typically 
require by default a supermajority or unanimity. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2013). 
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agreement itself, require 990 of these 1,000 members to constitute a quorum 
and agree. It would probably be difficult to get 100 of these members into 
the same meeting, much less to get 990 of them to agree on anything. And 
to prevent even the possibility of agreement, 20 of them could be asked to 
agree in advance, for yet another nominal sum, to vote “no” on every matter 
presented in the LLC’s management meetings. Classical organizational law 
(such as the law of corporations in the early- and mid-1900s) prevented or at 
least inhibited private parties from structuring the internal governance of an 
entity in this manner, in particular, by closely scrutinizing private agreements 
dictating how to vote.35 Indeed, classical corporate law required annual 
meetings of shareholders,36 but LLC statutes ordinarily dispense with this 
requirement.37 The animating principle of modern organizational law, which 
reaches its fulfillment in the law of LLCs, is again “freedom of contract” in 
matters of internal governance; these sorts of voting agreements are 
expressly permitted by modern law, even in corporations.38 They should be 
uncontroversial in LLCs. 
Of course, such extreme governance techniques will not ordinarily be 
necessary. A small group of individuals all interested in giving an 
autonomous system legal personhood probably would be sufficient to 
achieve the same result. Four humans in favor of my project could create an 
entity governed by algorithm, all remain members, and write an operating 
agreement that requires their unanimous consent to interfere with the 
algorithm, along with private contracts not to interfere or seek dissolution. 
Importantly, however, adding vetogates is meaningfully different from 
a simpler structure in which a Founder remains attached to an LLC just to 
keep the LLC from being dissolved by a legal system that requires businesses 
to have owners. That sort of arrangement may be effective in giving an 
algorithm the potential to have legal consequences, but it is fragile because 
it depends on the Founder’s ongoing cooperation. It provides no new 
meaningful freedom to the entity or the autonomous system that it was meant 
to enable, and it permits the Founder to appropriate any of the LLC’s gains 
selfishly because the Founder (as the only member) could simply, by default, 
rewrite the LLC’s operating agreement at any time.39 But vetogates, 
 
 35 See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 464–65 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing the history of restrictions on voting agreements in 
corporate law). 
 36 E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016). 
 37 See, e.g., RULLCA § 407(d) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013) (“An action requiring 
the vote or consent of members under this [act] may be taken without a meeting”). 
 38 E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016). 
 39 Not surprisingly, LLC statutes are often flexible enough to permit creative solutions even to this 
problem. For example, an LLC’s operating agreement might adopt an extremely onerous amendment 
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complicated amendment procedures, and simple supermajority requirements 
among even a small group of individuals all present meaningfully more 
practical freedom for the entity, and they all make it less likely that any 
individual will be able to act selfishly in order to appropriate the assets of the 
entity. 
In short, an operating agreement’s power (as against the current 
members’ or managers’ present intent) is not an all-or-nothing proposition; 
agreements can be made more or less powerful simply by restricting the 
practical ability of members to interfere with their operation. Apart from the 
rarely exercised statutory power to dissolve an LLC because of deadlock—
which, additionally, an organizer may attempt to hedge against through 
private contracting, particularly if the potential suits for deadlock are 
foreseen when an entity is organized—vetogates confer an indefinitely large 
amount of power on the operating agreement at the expense of the current 
members or managers. 
A quick reminder at this stage may be helpful, before I justify the 
legality of Part I’s technique: Just as for Part I’s technique, for the 
propositions about cross-ownership and vetogates that I have made here to 
be correct and practically significant, only one state would need to endorse 
them. Other states will not, under current law, interfere in the internal 
governance of an entity.40 To the extent that autonomous, algorithmically 
controlled entities become popular over time, organizers could easily choose 
the jurisdictions most favorable to their chosen vetogates or cross-ownership 
strategies.41 
C. Defiance, Obfuscation, and Nullification 
There is a further practical consideration that would permit the same 
result as Part I’s technique even if courts refused to honor it. LLC operating 
agreements are private documents, generally not available to nonparties or 
 
procedure that is unlikely ever to be satisfied even if the LLC has only one member. Under RULLCA, 
“the means and conditions for amending the operating agreement” are subject to the operating agreement 
itself. RULLCA § 110(a)(4). And RULLCA explicitly permits an operating agreement to “specify that 
its amendment requires the approval of a person that is not a party to the operating agreement or the 
satisfaction of a condition.” Id. § 112(a). In other words, LLC statutes permit vetogates even for 
conventional, single-member LLCs. 
 40 See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) 
(“It is now well established that only the law of the state of incorporation governs and determines issues 
relating to a corporation’s internal affairs.”). 
 41 Cf. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974) (initiating a long-running debate about how the motivations for the choice of Delaware law 
among corporate organizers should influence legal policy at the national level). 
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to courts or governments in the abstract.42 To oppose either of this Part’s 
techniques, or Part I’s central technique, a third party would have to discover 
that it was being used and then prove it to the court. In the unlikely event that 
uses of these techniques were discovered by a private third party, those 
behind the techniques would have the opportunity to refashion private 
agreements as they saw fit—to cure anticipated legal problems for the 
duration of a court case, or even simply to dishonestly represent the nature 
of the relevant entity’s internal governance.43 And in the case of cross-
ownership, the two related entities may be formed in different states, 
potentially complicating discovery and even jurisdiction. 
There is also, of course, a simpler sort of defiance: an algorithm or its 
promoter may simply organize a functionally memberless LLC and falsely 
specify the name of a member. In short, we probably could not stop 
algorithms from engaging in basic legal relationships even if we wanted to 
do so. 
III. THE LEGAL SOUNDNESS OF AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES UNDER CURRENT 
STATUTES 
Part II demonstrated that LLCs that are not subject to internal-
governance oversight from existing legal persons are practically workable 
and probably unavoidable even if courts were inclined to oppose them. This 
Part extends the argument by showing that courts, in their role as interpreters 
of state LLC statutes, are unlikely to oppose them as a matter of law. 
To be clear, when I speak of the “legal soundness” of zero-member 
LLCs, I refer only to their possible long-term existence under current LLC 
statutes. Several attendant issues are beyond the scope of this Essay, 
including (1) whether as a policy matter the LLC statutes should be 
reformed, and (2) whether memberless entities functionally controlled by 
software raise new problems for courts, such as whether they make it too 
difficult to police fraud because fraud requires human intent. To put it 
differently, my argument here just concerns practical statutory interpretation 
and business law; it is aimed at courts and commentators who are interested 
in courts’ actions, not in future decisions by legislatures or authors of model 
 
 42 For example, RULLCA does not require that operating agreements be filed with the state, only 
that a “certificate of organization” containing such basic information as the company’s name, address, 
and registered agent be filed. See RULLCA § 201. 
 43 As a formal matter, an actor willing to be dishonest has an entirely open canvas until any particular 
document needs to be disclosed, at which point only those particular documents serve as ongoing 
constraints. Cf. SANJEEV ARORA & BOAZ BARAK, COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY: A MODERN 
APPROACH 260–61 (2009) (describing “adversary arguments” in analyzing complexity). 
114:23 (2019) Are Autonomous Entities Possible? 
35 
statutes. That said, in a common law system, evaluating what courts will do 
cannot and should not easily be separated from appropriate legal policies. 
This Part does two things: Section III.A responds to criticism of my 
recent work that Matt Scherer leveled in a series of blog posts and a recent 
article.44 Section III.B responds to what I believe is a potentially sounder and 
more general anxiety that motivates this type of criticism. 
A. Response to Criticism 
Based on his series of blogged essays and a recent article in the Nevada 
Law Journal, Matt Scherer clearly finds the outcome of Part I’s technique to 
be objectionable. His legal and technical argument against it is extremely 
thin, however, and rests largely on statutory definitions (rather than statutory 
rules) and on what I believe are several misunderstandings of business law 
and LLC statutes. 
1. Statutory Definitions 
Apart from general arguments about the absurdity of possible results, 
which I will address later,45 Scherer’s main legal argument is that definitions 
in LLC statutes, such as those that declare an LLC to be “an unincorporated 
organization of one or more persons,”46 prevent the existence of memberless 
LLCs.47 As he puts it, because of these definitions, “an LLC ceases to be an 
LLC once it becomes memberless.”48 This is a literalistic form of 
argumentation that aims to give substantive effects to casual statutory 
definitions written without those substantive effects in mind, and is not the 
correct way to interpret the statutes. 
Scherer’s main definition-based argument about the Revised Uniform 
LLC Act (RULLCA) and RULLCA-derived state statutes49 is that courts 
 
 44 See sources supra note 3. 
 45 See infra Section III.B. 
 46 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 102(m) (McKinney 2019). 
 47 See Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 266–70, 277. Similar arguments have been made before. For 
example, in a written debate with Don Weidner, Bob Hillman argued that the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act’s (RUPA) initial definition of a partnership as “an association of two or more persons,” 
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013), means that a partnership must dissolve 
when the penultimate partner dissociates. Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weidner, Partners Without 
Partners: The Legal Status of Single Person Partnerships, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 453–56 
(2012). Don Weidner, the Uniform Law Commission reporter for RUPA, responded as follows:  
I obviously think you are asking the definition of “partnership” to do too much by effectively 
operating as a special dissolution rule whenever partnerships no longer meet the language of the 
definition. RUPA contains three separate articles on partnership breakups, defining when and how 
liquidations versus buyouts are to take place.  
Id. at 457. 
 48 See Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 265. 
 49 Scherer uses Florida, Washington, and Wyoming as examples for this purpose. See id. at 277 n.86. 
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would not “recognize”50 a memberless LLC under RULLCA-derived 
statutory law because these statutes require “an LLC to be member- or 
manager-managed.”51 The statutes he cites do not in fact require this 
expressly, but, putting that aside, his argument fails even without looking 
beyond statutory definitions. RULLCA, along with the three state statutes he 
examines, defines a “member-managed LLC” simply as “a limited liability 
company that is not a manager-managed limited liability company;”52 the 
internal logic of the definitions themselves prevents them from having any 
substantive effect. In other words, Scherer’s argument is that if an LLC 
statute says (or even implies) that an LLC must be member-managed or 
manager-managed, some substantive consequence must follow, but the 
statutory definitions make clear on their own that the phrase “member-
managed or manager-managed” is a tautology, literally empty of substantive 
meaning.53 
Scherer’s main definitional argument under New York’s statute—that 
an LLC is “an unincorporated organization of one or more persons”54—is 
undercut by the same sentence in which the definition itself appears. That 
sentence purports to provide a definition “unless the context otherwise 
requires.”55 Clearly this definition cannot override the substantive 
requirements of a separate operative section that explicitly provides for 
conditions under which an LLC can exist with no members.56 That section of 
New York’s LLC statute begins, “A limited liability company is dissolved 
and its affairs shall be wound up . . . at any time there are no members . . . .”57 
The statute could have stopped there. It did not. The section continues by 
providing for situations in which a New York LLC does not dissolve when 
there are no members.58 In other words, the definition is inconsistent with, 
 
 50 Id. at 277. 
 51 Id. As background, a member-managed LLC structurally resembles a partnership, where 
individual owners make decisions about how to operate a business, whereas a manager-managed LLC 
structurally resembles more complex entities with a separation between ownership (membership) and 
control (management). 
 52 RULLCA § 102(12) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013); see also FLA STAT. ANN. 
§ 605.0102(41) (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.006(11) (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-29-102(xiii) (West 2019). 
 53 The same analysis applies to similar claims like “RULLCA allows only ‘members’ and ‘managers’ 
to manage an LLC . . . .” Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 274. The claims misunderstand the definition 
of “member-managed.” 
 54 Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 267–68 (emphasis omitted); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 102(m) 
(McKinney 2019). 
 55 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 102(m). 
 56 Id. § 701(a)(4). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. 
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and clearly not meant to override, the notion that an LLC can exist 
temporarily without members. If the definition does not exclude that case, 
why would it help us determine the maximal length of a period without 
members? 
Scherer also uses statutory references to “members” and “managers” 
(in such statutory phrases as “management of the limited liability company 
shall be vested in its members who shall manage the limited liability 
company”)59 to infer that the continued presence of those managers or 
members is necessary for the LLC to exist.60 But many LLC statutes include 
similar definitions and uses of the words “members” or “managers” even 
while explicitly permitting the possibility of memberless LLCs for various 
purposes. For example, Virginia’s LLC statute has many of the conventional 
characteristics of the LLC statutes described in Scherer’s article, but it 
explicitly addresses “the case of a limited liability company that has no 
members as of the commencement of its existence,”61 indicating clearly that 
an LLC needs no members to be formed. 
More generally, courts have rejected the argument that statutory 
definitions override the operative provisions of statutes,62 and since 1953, the 
Uniform Law Commission’s drafting rules have contained the simple 
maxim: “Do not include substantive provisions in a definition.”63 The 
features of statutes that I have discussed here demonstrate why: definitions 
are often more general than the context that specific, substantive statutory 
provisions require. In any event, most LLC statutes do not in fact define an 
LLC as an entity that has members, and New York’s, which does, contains 
language in the definition itself that ensures the definition will not conflict 
with the statute’s substantive provisions. 
 
 59 Id. § 401(a). 
 60 See Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 266–69. 
 61 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1038.1(A)(3) (2019). Unlike New York and RULLCA, Virginia does not 
even provide a default time limit for the appointment of a new member following the dissociation of the 
last member, a point I will discuss infra. See id. § 13.1-1038.1(A)(4). 
 62 See, e.g., Katt v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 313, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“For the 
definition . . . does not purport to be an operational section of the statute that explains the scope of its 
substantive provisions—it is not, for example, a provision that says, ‘The following types of entities are 
required to comply with this Act.’ Rather, the provision . . . simply defines a term, used at certain places 
in the statute . . . .”); Hamilton v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 528, 536 (1993) (“Definitions, whether statutory or 
regulatory, are not themselves operative provisions of law.”) (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STAT. CONST. § 27.02, at 459 (4th ed. 1985)). 
 63 DRAFTING RULES FOR UNIFORM AND MODEL ACTS, Rule 302(e) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012), 
available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/drafting-rules-2012 [http://perma.cc/77FY-
5M3T]; cf. Origin, Nature and Scope of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, 62 HANDBOOK NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 321, 344 (1953) (“Do not 
write substantive provisions or artificial concepts into definitions.”). 
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Scherer’s own analysis occasionally shows why literalistic uses of 
statutory definitions and similar non-operative provisions often lead to 
interpretations that cannot possibly be correct. For example, in his blog posts 
on this subject, he argues that in New York’s LLC act, “the statutory context 
strongly indicates that the managers or member-managers must be natural 
persons”64 because the statute refers to a manager as “hi[m] or her.”65 This is 
a strikingly incorrect reading of the statute. For decades, it has been 
commonplace for one entity to manage another, or to be a member of 
another, in New York and elsewhere.66 In his most recent article, Scherer 
does not make this claim but instead evocatively describes the New York 
statute’s use of personal, gendered pronouns as a “legislative Freudian slip” 
that is “a powerful—if not inescapable—signal that the legislature intended 
natural persons to exercise ultimate control over LLCs.”67 This is a milder 
claim, but it is similarly misplaced and puts far too much importance on the 
details of non-operative statutory text. The imprecise use of personal 
pronouns is a commonplace statutory artifact that results from imprecision 
in drafting, much as statutes used to use male pronouns to refer to all 
people.68 
2. Business-Law Foundations 
Additionally, because of contextual features of business law that 
Scherer sometimes neglects, his arguments would prove far too much. That 
is, his reasoning offers a perspective disconnected from some nuances of 
business law and practice, and instead it applies basic statutory-analytical 
techniques to complex, context-rich business-law statutes. It is one thing to 
say that legal personhood for robots is an idea too crazy for American courts 
and to stop there;69 it is another to try to demonstrate it as a technical matter 
of organizational law. 
 
 64 Scherer, Part One, supra note 3. 
 65 Id. (citing N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 2019)). 
 66 The rise of that practice came with the use of corporations as general partners of limited 
partnerships, to combine the tax advantages of limited partnerships with the full limited liability of 
corporations. For a general discussion of the history, see Donald J. Weidner, The Existence of State and 
Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 67 Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 268 n.36. 
 68 Statutes commonly use gendered personal pronouns in contexts where they may apply 
uncontroversially to both business entities and natural persons. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 655.417(3) (2019) 
(“[T]he action taken does not prejudice the right of a creditor of the participating or converting financial 
institution to have his or her debts paid out of the assets thereof . . . .”); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-
12009.5(b) (2019) (referring explicitly to the possibility that “the petitioner or applicant is a corporation” 
and later to “the petitioner or applicant, or his or her principal”). 
 69 I address this type of more general argument infra Section III.B. 
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Scherer’s most significant mistake is to assume, contrary to law and 
practice, that memberless entities themselves are simply outside the 
contemplation of modern organizational statutes. The innovation of my 
earlier work was to demonstrate that the flexibility of modern entity law can 
empower algorithms to have legal effect—that, effectively, the rise of 
organizational forms based on contractual agreement (like the LLC) rather 
than preordained structure (like the classical American corporation) has 
implications for algorithms that can be expressed as or recognized by 
agreements. But my contribution was not to invent the notion of a 
memberless entity in the first place—that notion is in fact explicitly 
authorized by many modern LLC statutes and is widely in use, although, of 
course, for more limited purposes than my analysis suggests is possible. 
Virginia provides perhaps the clearest example overall. Virginia’s LLC 
statute, as I noted in the last section, explicitly allows LLCs to be created 
without members, and it provides no default statutory time limit for 
memberless LLCs.70 Similarly, North Carolina’s current LLC statute refers 
to the possibility that “initial members are not identified in the articles of 
organization.”71 That section replaced an older version of the statute that 
specified that the organization of an LLC required “one or more initial 
members,” but that requirement was removed.72 
RULLCA itself draws from these sources and explicitly allows LLCs 
to be created without members, providing expressly for a situation where 
“the company will have no members when the [Secretary of State] files the 
certificate.”73 This is not an accident; as RULLCA’s co-reporter has 
described, it was an intentional decision.74 Certainly the sort of “shelf 
LLCs”—that is, LLCs that are warehoused on a virtual shelf until their 
creators are ready to use them—that these provisions authorize are different 
from an autonomously functioning entity, but most of Scherer’s technical 
statutory argument does not distinguish between the two. Instead, his 
arguments rest on the proposition that a memberless entity in the first place 
 
 70 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 71 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-20(c) (2013). 
 72 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-20(c) (2005). As another example, Minnesota’s LLC formation statute 
explicitly contemplates a state of affairs where there is an operating agreement but no members. See 
MINN. STAT. § 322C.0701 subdiv.1(3) (2015). Its default dissolution provision exempts the case where 
no members have yet joined. Id. (“[F]ollowing the admission of the initial member or members, the 
passage of 90 consecutive days during which the company has no members” will by default cause 
dissolution). 
 73 RULLCA § 201(b)(3) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013). 
 74 Carter G. Bishop, Through the Looking Glass: Status Liability and the Single Member and Series 
LLC Perspective, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 459, 471 (2009) (“This so-called ‘shelf LLC’ attracted 
considerable debate in the drafting of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA). 
As a result, RULLCA included its own version of the ‘shelf LLC.’”). 
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is somehow beyond the pale—something that our legal system has never 
imagined, does not recognize, and would not possibly tolerate. This is simply 
untrue, and the explicit recognition of memberless entities by several 
statutes—and indeed by the uniform statute drafted by the Uniform Law 
Commission—should put to rest the idea that the statutes are incompatible 
with the existence of zero-member entities and that the drafters did not 
contemplate such entities. 
Scherer expresses a few other notions about business entities that are 
either outdated or that otherwise do not reflect modern entity law. These 
observations may not matter directly for my argument about autonomous 
entities, but they are worth addressing because modern business-entity law 
is subtler than even many lawyers realize. 
Scherer rests a significant part of his description of entity law on a New 
York corporate law case from 1934.75 Indeed, he quotes a full passage from 
that case to make the point that a corporation ceases to have any legal 
existence—including any capacity to file a lawsuit—after it is dissolved.76 
But this is not the modern understanding. For example, the modern Model 
Business Corporation Act (Model Act) gives dissolved corporations many 
powers that easily qualify them for legal personhood under my definition,77 
including the power to collect and sell assets.78 Contrary to Scherer’s 
proposition that a dissolved corporation “would not have standing to sue to 
vindicate rights the entity might have had when it still was in active 
existence,”79 the Model Act explicitly declares that, today, “[d]issolution of 
a corporation does not . . . prevent commencement of a proceeding by or 
against the corporation in its corporate name.”80 
Of course, my argument does not concern corporations; it suggests 
possibilities primarily for modern LLCs. There too, however, dissolution has 
a more complex meaning than Scherer gives it credit for.81 Contrary to what 
 
 75 See Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 262 (“The dissolution of a corporation implies its utter 
extinction and obliteration as a body capable of suing or being sued . . . .”) (quoting MacAffer v. Bos. & 
M.R.R., 273 N.Y.S. 679, 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934), rev’d, 197 N.E. 328 (N.Y. 1935)). MacAffer was 
an appellate case that, interestingly, the New York high court reversed, holding as follows: “[A company] 
continues to hold its property for the benefit of those equitably entitled to it. If there be dispute as to 
whether the conditions have been performed, upon which corporate rights and powers have been granted, 
it retains ‘life’ sufficient to defend its right to exist.” MacAffer v. Bos. & M.R.R., 197 N.E. 328, 330 
(N.Y. 1935). 
 76 Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 262. 
 77 See supra Part I. 
 78 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 14.05(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
      79 Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 262. 
 80 Id. § 14.05(b)(5). 
 81 See RULLCA § 702(b)(2)(C) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013) (“In winding up its 
activities, a limited liability company . . . may . . . prosecute and defend actions and proceedings, whether 
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Scherer suggests, an entity may last years after dissolution if the winding-up 
period takes that long, during which time the entity may be wound up by 
nonmembers. These nonmembers may be bound contractually to the entity 
or to previous members.82 This means, of course, that even dissolution need 
not be a bar to empowering algorithms under law; even a dissolved entity 
could be controlled by an algorithm, at least for the purposes of winding up. 
To put it differently, even if it were shown that a particular attempt to create 
an autonomous entity has necessarily triggered the dissolution provision of 
some statute, that does not cause the entity to cease to exist on its own; it 
merely begins a new phase of the entity’s life.83 
Scherer also misapplies the distinction between mandatory rules and 
default rules in LLC law and as a result, he overstates the limitations on 
operating agreements under modern LLC statutes.84 For example, Scherer 
suggests that under RULLCA, an operating agreement cannot govern “the 
circumstances under which a LLC must dissolve”85 because RULLCA does 
not explicitly authorize the operating agreement to do so. But the statute is 
clear about limitations on the operating agreement’s power, and it explicitly 
permits the agreement to govern “the activities of the company and the 
conduct of those activities.”86 RULLCA’s drafters, like those of all of the 
Uniform Law Commission’s modern entity statutes, paid special attention to 
the distinction between mandatory and default rules. RULLCA’s provision 
concerning mandatory rules, Section 105(c), specifically lists those 
dissolution provisions that are mandatory, and that list does not include the 
one provision on which Part I’s technique relies.87 That is, the statute clearly 
contemplates a 90-day window without members by default, and it permits 
the operating agreement to change that window.88 And again, at the end of 
that window, the result is only dissolution of the entity, not termination and 
 
civil, criminal, or administrative . . . .”); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 703(b) (McKinney 2019) (“[T]he 
persons winding up the limited liability company’s affairs may, in the name of and for and on behalf of 
the limited liability company, prosecute and defend suits, whether civil, criminal or administrative . . . .”). 
 82 As a result, the same sort of vetogates I described in Part II may apply, either through the operating 
agreement or by private contract. 
 83 For more information on the distinction between dissolution, winding up, and termination, see 
SHAWN J. BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS 140–65 (2014). 
 84 Mandatory rules limit what parties may contract about, whereas default rules operate unless parties 
choose to displace them. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
 85 Scherer, Part One, supra note 3. 
 86 RULLCA § 110(a)(3). 
 87 Indeed, the most recent revision to RULLCA makes more explicit the distinction between 
mandatory and default provisions for dissolution, explicitly indicating in the comment to § 701 that 
“[e]xcept for Paragraphs (a)(4) and (5) [concerning judicial and administrative dissolution, respectively] 
this section compromises [sic] default rules.” RULLCA § 701 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). 
 88 RULLCA § 701(a)(3) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013). 
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the consequent destruction of the entity’s legal personhood; the entity 
unambiguously continues to exist through the winding-up period.89 
B. Absurdity 
Notwithstanding what I believe to be a mistaken statute-based critique, 
underlying Scherer’s argument is the potentially legitimate notion that what 
I have proposed is simply too crazy for courts to accept. I believe this is what 
he means when he says that courts would invalidate my technique in Part I 
as “absurd,” although as I have discussed, he ties that argument to specific, 
incorrect views about the business-entity statutes. But what about the 
underlying notion itself? That is, is Part I’s technique too novel or scary for 
us to tolerate? 
To be clear, I do not defend the formalistic interpretation of statutes 
without regard to their consequences; I would be happy to avoid a literal 
interpretation of LLC statutes if it led even to bad results, much less absurd 
ones. But to prohibit the transactional technique I have offered, courts would 
need a substantive reason to do so, and I think such a reason is much more 
elusive than Scherer assumes. Moreover, the questions that arise in this area 
are more contextually and procedurally intricate than is evident on first 
glance. As a result, on reflection, what may initially seem absurd seems like 
only a modest extension of parties’ capabilities under very broad business-
entity statutes—the sort of extension that has happened many times in the 
history of organizational law to suit changing needs. 
1. Timing and Justice 
It is easy to declare in the abstract that courts would find what I have 
proposed to be “absurd,” but the question does not arise in the abstract; it is 
important to consider how the legal question might arise in the first place. 
For example, it would be easy, but incorrect, to assume that the question of 
a memberless LLC’s legal viability would arise in court immediately after 
the last member dissociates. That sequence of events is extremely unlikely. 
Instead, significant economic transactions are likely to take place between 
that point and the first legal challenge to the entity. Not only will it be 
 
 89 E.g., id. § 702(b)(2)(B). Similar misunderstandings seem to lead Scherer to occasionally 
mischaracterize my argument. For example, he writes: “Bayern attempts to dismiss the significance of [a 
purported] limitation [in RULLCA] by suggesting that a state could adopt RULLCA without it.” Scherer, 
Beasts, supra note 3, at 274. But my argument was only that “this provision, perhaps surprisingly, appears 
not to be a mandatory rule imposed by the uniform statute.” Bayern, Zero-Member LLC, supra note 1, at 
268. A “mandatory rule” in the context of a business-entity statute is one that is binding on the parties in 
entities governed by the statute. The meaning of my sentence is that RULLCA does not make a particular 
provision mandatory on LLC members or managers, not that the enactment of the section is not 
“mandatory” on states considering the uniform act’s adoption. 
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difficult by that point to reverse the transactions that have occurred, but it 
would almost certainly be inequitable to do so in at least many types of cases. 
Suppose, fancifully in view of today’s technology, that my technique in 
Part I is followed in order to give legal effect to the operation of a newly 
built, artificially intelligent robot. No announcement of this course of 
conduct needs to be made to the world.90 Suppose then that the robot uses its 
newfound legal power to cause the LLC to buy a house for $350,000. The 
LLC owns the house for eight months, by which time the house has 
appreciated in value to $390,000. Thereafter, the neighbors discover that the 
owner is an LLC controlled by a robot. Perhaps they or the original owner 
object to being forced to deal with a non-human entity, so they bring suit to 
object to the final step of my transactional procedure in Part I. 
Most of Scherer’s argument depends on a court’s strong motivation to 
invalidate that step and declare the LLC dissolved, based only on the formal 
proposition that businesses must be backed by humans. But in the context of 
the suit, there is no functional principle of justice or efficiency that appears 
to motivate that result. What would the consequence of dissolution be? 
Would the original owner get the house back and also keep the sum paid to 
purchase it? Would the state seize the house and sell it at auction? What if 
the property at stake were not a house but a functioning nonprofit 
organization providing services to third parties, or a functioning business 
making money for itself and reinvesting it in the community—functioning 
only because of the operation of the algorithm behind the LLC? More 
mundanely, in view of present technology, what if it were a simple online 
service breaking even financially, providing some mechanical but useful 
online service, such as brokering cloud storage in exchange for 
cryptocurrency? In those cases, not just one but millions of transactions may 
already have occurred. 
As these examples all suggest, what is the motivation to undo what has 
been done? Is it just prejudice against novel legal structures? As I indicated 
earlier, common law courts do not have that prejudice, particularly when 
applying business-law statutes.91 The history of modern business law—and 
entity law generally—has been a history of expansion into new structures to 
suit changing times and emerging needs. As I pointed out earlier, an entity 
with a single human member was regarded as strange and unjustified not too 
long ago.92 
 
 90 New York’s high court recognized a similar notion in overturning the case that Scherer uses to 
introduce the notion of legal persons in business law; as that court evocatively put it: “Change of status 
is invisible to the world.” MacAffer v. Bos. & M.R.R., 197 N.E. 328, 330 (N.Y. 1935). 
 91 See Bayern, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 92 See id. 
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Perhaps there is an instinct that these examples are fine but that the 
underlying structure offers significant potential for abuse—say the robot is 
not a benign homeowner or a beneficial actor in the public interest but some 
exemplar of inhuman, dead-hand control. If so, that is a separate matter, and 
we should then debate the appropriate legal responses to substantive abuse, 
not the formal status of a memberless LLC. Conventional LLCs have been 
significantly abused, or at least have significantly reduced transparency in 
areas such as real estate, as the New York Times has documented over the 
past several years.93 But nobody thinks to call the LLC statutes themselves 
absurd for facilitating that activity. Instead, the statutes produce a particular 
undesirable consequence, but the consequence is undesirable because of the 
harm it causes, not because of a formal matter of internal governance. 
Moreover, what standing would third parties have to bring suit to 
enforce Scherer’s intuitions? For example, if the neighbors of a robot 
objected to living near a robot-owned house, what claim would they bring? 
Who has been legally or equitably wronged? What provision of the statute 
would be used to support dissolution? Scherer does not offer answers to these 
questions and I do not believe any answers will exist until we see the 
structures in practice and develop more focused policy concerns and 
responses to them in the real world. 
2. Alleged Absurdity in Context 
It should be clear from Section III.A that memberless entities alone are 
not absurd; indeed, they are specifically contemplated by various LLC acts. 
Nor is it crazy to imagine that a legal entity’s operation can be controlled to 
some degree by algorithm; this happens every time employees receive an 
algorithmically scheduled pay increase not directly implemented by a 
human. It also happens routinely when people place orders online that are 
accepted and whose fulfillment is directed by algorithm. 
The concern underlying Scherer’s reaction to my technique seems to 
arise only when memberless entities combine with algorithmic control. 
Scherer does not explain why this combination is crazy, except to say that it 
has not happened before, and to quote generalities like law “orders human 
activities and relations,” emphasizing the “human,” from Black’s Law 
Dictionary.94 There is a simple formalistic response to this formalistic point: 
“human relations” include the interactions between humans and the products 
of human engineering. But, in fairness to Scherer, I believe his response is a 
 
 93 E.g., Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Hidden Wealth Flows to Elite New York Condos, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2015, at A1. 
 94 Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 260–61 & nn.1–2 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014)). 
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common first reaction to the possibility of algorithmic legal entities. Perhaps 
it is a proxy for more focused concerns, some of which I have described in 
previous work: the enabling of fraud, the potential for dead-hand control, and 
so on.95 But as I have just discussed, potential problems—and even potential 
abuse—are distinct from absurdity. 
If the objection is that humans must retain oversight of all legal 
creations, it may be worth noting that an entity controlled internally by an 
operating agreement that defers all decisions to an algorithm is still subject 
to human laws, just as any LLC is. It can still be regulated, sued, or dissolved 
by the state. The question is simply whether humans specifically need 
ongoing internal oversight of all legal entities—through governance 
mechanisms under entity-law statutes. Again, Part II showed that humans are 
already not guaranteed this oversight de facto. But the question is whether 
the law should recognize that state of affairs more formally. If LLC statutes 
permit it through their explicit dissolution provisions, what is the extreme 
absurdity that courts would identify to prohibit the use of those mechanisms? 
Moreover, if the concern is only that humans will not have enough specific 
oversight, consider that an “algorithm” to which an operating agreement 
defers may be implemented by humans; it need not be embodied entirely in 
software.96 
If the objection is that organizations should not exist except for human 
purposes, the structure I have outlined in Part I is fully consistent with a 
relatively conventional organization that provides an economic benefit to 
nonmember beneficiaries—people who are functionally and economically 
shareholders but have no voting power.97 For example, consider a 
memberless organization that awards grants to individual humans based on 
the operation of software, which was designed with the goal of identifying 
and aiding humans who verifiably engage in certain activity (e.g., produce a 
formally verifiable mathematical proof). Is it obviously absurd that, in the 
context of potentially formalized online interactions, organizers would want 
to set up an entity that takes power away from any of them and gives it 
entirely to an algorithm? Perhaps, in a particular case, the class of economic 
beneficiaries is fluid and inconsistent with the traditional notion of 
membership. For example, maybe it includes everyone who is participating 
 
 95 See Bayern, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 16, at 152–53. 
 96 In other words, the technique I outlined in Part I does not require computer software; the notion of 
an algorithm, particularly for the purposes of Part I’s technique, is general enough to include any 
procedure, including those implemented by humans. Cf. John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 
3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417 (1980) (discussing, in the context of the philosophy of mind, formal 
algorithms implemented by humans). 
 97 Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-01 (2018) (drawing an explicit statutory distinction between a 
“member” and an “economic interest owner”). 
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in a particular peer-to-peer network during a particular period, or maybe the 
organizers want to avoid creating unnecessary legal rights in a group of 
members. Why would a court be motivated to disallow this structure just 
because the entity has no formal members? 
In short, an argument against Part I’s technique without understanding 
the nuanced possibilities that the technique may enable will likely prove too 
much, or at least it would get in the way of the generativity of organizational 
law—a generativity that has created significant wealth over the last hundred 
years. 
3. The Context of Technological Change 
Putting everything else aside, it is hard to see how something could be 
“absurd” when it is already contentious in a rich literature. For the last few 
decades, people have debated the legal personhood of nonhuman entities 
such as potentially intelligent software, and there is nowhere near a 
consensus against the idea. Almost thirty years ago, Lawrence Solum 
addressed the question squarely, and he concluded that “[o]ur theories of 
personhood cannot provide an a priori chart for the deep waters at the 
borderlines of status.”98 His practical solution was to wait until “our daily 
encounters with artificial intelligence . . . raise the question of 
personhood.”99 Mine was instead to try to develop a productive solution that 
sidestepped the question of how much intelligence (or some other quality) is 
needed to achieve the basic incidents of legal personality, precisely because 
the philosophical questions are so difficult and because the legal system will 
almost certainly lag behind reality if we wait.100 There are, of course, other 
possible solutions. For example, the European Parliament recently proposed 
to the European Commission that the European Union grant “a specific legal 
status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated 
autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic 
persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause.”101 The 
proposal specifically contemplated the case in which “robots make 
autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties 
independently.”102 
 
 98 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1287 
(1992). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Bayern, Autonomous, supra note 1, at 110–11. 
 101 2018 Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 2018 O.J. (C 252) 239, 250, available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017IP0051&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/GK42-7P6L].  
 102 Id.; cf. David J. Calverley, Imagining a Non-biological Machine as a Legal Person, 22 AI & SOC. 
523 (2008) (summarizing competing bases, or “theories,” that underlie legal personhood). 
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In this context, it seems far too conservative to presuppose that courts 
will regard the attempt to achieve a similar result through transactional 
procedures using existing entity law as “absurd.” Even if they were inclined 
to oppose my interpretation of the business-entity statutes, courts will not 
make the decision in the abstract. They will be faced with specific facts that 
require them to consider the potential adaptability of my transactional 
technique to the various human ends I described in the previous section; any 
real, specific, downsides in moral or economic terms of permitting the 
technique (which Scherer does not even mention); the business needs 
presented by new technology; and the strong trends toward the increased 
flexibility of entity law in the last several decades.103  Moreover, particularly 
when addressing new technological developments, policymakers currently 
appear to be going out of their way to promote, rather than to stifle, new and 
creative organizational structures, even when those structures would remove 
discretion from ongoing human managers.104  
CONCLUSION 
My transactional technique to create algorithmic entities under 
American LLC laws is supported by specific mechanisms laid out in LLC 
statutes. It is consistent with the text and structure of the statutes, and also 
with strong historical trends toward flexibility in entity structure and 
governance. It is not, as Scherer has suggested,105 the result of a blind, 
literalistic reading of the text of a statute. The scheme may seem unusual at 
first, but so did most of the significant developments in entity law. 
That LLC statutes can permit a legal entity to be controlled exclusively 
by an algorithm, without further internal governance, may be novel. But far 
from being absurd, memberless entities are easily within the contemplation 
and structure of the LLC statutes. The exclusive control of such an entity by 
an algorithm is merely the culmination of decades of increased power for 
operating agreements and decreased power for the membership of legal 
entities. 
Besides, we probably could not prevent this structure from arising even 
if we wanted to. 
 
 
 103 For more information on these trends, see BAYERN, supra note 83, at 243–45. 
 104 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4173 (West 2018) (providing for a new type of LLC in 
Vermont that “may provide for its governance, in whole or in part, through blockchain technology”) 
(emphasis added). 
 105 E.g., Scherer, Beasts, supra note 3, at 265–66, 273. 
